logically neutral approach will, it is hoped, inform future debate about regulation of consumer credit and optimal bankruptcy policy.
I. BACKGROUND ON BANKRUPTCY REFORM
President George W. Bush signed BAPCPA into law on April 20, 2005 , and most of its provisions came into effect 180 days later, on October 17, 2005. With regard to consumers, the statute made it more difficult to discharge debt. 2 In particular, BAPCPA broadened the categories of debt that are nondischargeable and adopted a "means testing" requirement that limits access to Chapter 7 and thereby forces debtors to file for Chapter 13 instead. 3 The statute also imposed other filing barriers, including higher filing fees, a lengthening of the period between permitted filings, and an increase in the costs and risks faced by professionals who assist consumers filing for bankruptcy. 4 Unsecured creditors, including credit card issuers, were the most likely beneficiaries of BAPCPA. Whereas secured creditors, such as mortgage or auto lenders, are protected under Chapter 7 by their security interests in the debtor's house or car, unsecured creditors often receive little or nothing in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Pushing filers into Chapter 13 would increase recovery for these unsecured creditors. 5 Furthermore, delaying bankruptcy allows unsecured credit card lenders to increase their claims through accrual of interest at high pre-petition contractual rates, and to collect more from debtors who are not yet shielded by the automatic stay. 6 A key justification for BAPCPA was that it would make credit more affordable to consumers. President Bush explained that he signed the law "because when bankruptcy is less common, credit can be extended to more people at better rates." 7 (Bush 2005) . Similarly, the House of Representatives Report approvingly cited the Senate Judiciary Committee testimony of Professor Todd Zywicki as excerpted below:
[W]hen creditors are unable to collect debts because of bankruptcy, some of those losses are inevitably passed on to responsible Americans who live up to their financial obliga-'See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375 (2007) . 3 Chapter 7 is preferable to Chapter 13 for many financially distressed consumers because Chapter 7 results in a discharge of many debts, leaving future income relatively unencumbered, while Chapter 13 requires debtors to repay their debts from future income. Id, at 380.
4 Id. at 377. 5 1d. at 379-80.
6Id. at 392-93. 7 Press Release, George W. Bush, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention, Consumer Protection Act (April 20, 2005 )(on file with author).
(Vol. 83 tions.... We all pay for bankruptcy abuse in higher down payments, higher interest rates, and higher costs for goods and services. 8 In his full testimony, Professor Zywicki argued that bankruptcy increases the price that consumers pay for credit card debt across multiple price points and that BAPCPA would reduce these costs to consumers.
This bankruptcy "tax" takes many forms. It is obviously reflected in higher interest rates ....
It is [also] reflected in shorter grace periods for paying bills and higher penalty fees and late-charges for those who miss payments ... [R] educing the number of strategic bankruptcies will reduce the bankruptcy tax paid by every American family .... These reforms will make the bankruptcy system more fair, equitable, and efficient, not only for bankruptcy debtors and creditors, but for all Americans. 9 This promise of cost savings to the average American family was critical to the passage of BAPCPA. As Professor Elizabeth Warren explained in 2004:
[I]t is hard to persuade Congress to vote for something that could easily be characterized as a bill to squeeze hard-working families down on their luck in order to improve profits for a few big corporate lenders. [Claims of cost savings to the average family are] a way to appear to align the interests of ordinary families with billion-dollar multi-national lenders ... [A] promise of $400 to each hard-working family in America will give politicians plenty of political cover for their votes [in favor of BAPCPA].10
With the promise that any gains from BAPCPA would not be captured by lenders, but would be shared widely with the voting public, advocates of the statute garnered more widespread support for the law.
Supporters and critics of BAPCPA both agreed that the new law would benefit credit card companies. However, critics were skeptical that benefits would be passed on to consumers for two reasons. First, advocates of BAPCPA maintained financial ties to the credit industry that suggested that SH.R. REP. No. 109-031, pt. 1 (2005 Art. 4 (2004) . The $400 is an estimate of the cost of bankruptcy to each American family. According to Professor Warren, the $400 estimate was devised by lobbyists working for the credit industry using dubious analytical methods, then spread as a 'fact' through an aggressive, well-funded lobbying and public relations campaign, Id.
they might be more interested in increasing credit card company profits than in benefiting consumers. Second, the history of the credit card industry suggested a tenuous link between bankruptcy rates and credit card pricing.
Critics like Professor Elizabeth Warren,' Professor Ronald Mann, 12 and Senator Edward Kennedy 13 have noted the extensive role played by the credit card industry in drafting BAPCPA, in advocating for its passage, and in funding the campaigns of politicians who voted in favor of it. They argued that the role of credit card companies indicated that the bill was contrary to the interests of consumers. This argument is only persuasive if one believes that there is an inherent conflict of interest between credit card companies and their customers. Although the credit card industry clearly believed that it would profit from BAPCPA, this alone does not establish that consumers would not benefit as well.
Critics pointed to data suggesting a tenuous link between bankruptcy rates and credit card prices. Historically, bankruptcy rates have not correlated with either interest rates on consumer credit cards, or with the spread between consumer credit card interest rates and the risk free rate.' 4 Critics did not claim that consumers would never benefit, but argued that there was at least good reason to be skeptical that consumer benefits would materialize.
II. METHODS AND DATA
Professor Todd Zywicki and other advocates of BAPCPA suggested that customers would see savings in the costs of both credit card debt and other credit products. This paper focuses only on credit card debt for three reasons. First, credit card companies are likely beneficiaries of the new law. i5 Second, prior to enactment of BAPCPA, it was unknown whether credit card companies would pass on the benefits of the statute to consumers. Third, it is relatively easy to measure whether credit card companies benefited from BAPCPA and whether those benefits were passed on to consumers.
If the supporters of BAPCPA were right, then the statute should have reduced the number of personal bankruptcies, reduced credit card company losses, and reduced the cost of credit to users of credit cards. Any such costs savings could manifest across credit cards' multiple price points, including (1) late fees, (2) over-limit fees, (3) annual fees, (4) interest rates and (5) grace periods. The present study tests whether BAPCPA led to these effects by (Vol. 83
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comparing absolute levels and trends -in personal bankruptcies, credit card lenders' charge-offs, late fees, over-limit fees, interest rates, and grace periods -before and after the effective date of the statute.
To control for other factors that might have caused higher or lower costs of consumer credit, the present study considered changes to the risk free interest rate. The risk free interest rate reflects broad macroeconomic factors that affect economy-wide costs of credit. The spread between the risk free rate and the annual percentage rates ("APRs") charged on credit card balances reflects the risk-adjusted price of credit card debt. The present study uses the yield on fiveyear treasury notes as the risk free rate to match the duration of credit extended to the typical household carrying a credit card balance. 16 This study also controls for inflation and population growth.
The present study discusses, but does not formally control for changes in macroeconomic variables like unemployment, real GDP growth, and household leverage as measured by the household debt service ratio (DSR) 1 7 and financial obligation ratios (FOR).' 8 The decision not to control for these macroeconomic variables results from the small sample size of observationsat most 8 observations from the first quarter of 2006 to the fourth quarter of 2007. The maximum sample size is 8 because these variables are reported on a quarterly basis. BAPCPA went into effect during the fourth quarter of 2005, and this study does not consider data after the fourth quarter of 2007, in order to avoid the affect of the financial crisis and tightening of credit markets that began with the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008. With such a small sample size, statistical power is low. By contrast, interest rates and fees are reported on a monthly basis and therefore have over three times as many observations. This study also tests other possible outcomes of BAPCPA -such as an increase in credit card industry profits -and considers factors that might explain such an outcome, including the level of credit card industry concentration, price competition, and price transparency.
" 5 The average household carrying a credit card balance has been carrying it for over 3.5 years, and families with larger balances tend to carry their debt for longer than those with smaller balances. Center for Responsible Lending, The Plastic Safety Net: The Reality behind Debt in America, 8 (2005) , http:// www.demos.org/pubs/PNS low.pdf. This suggests that the average length of time it takes a borrower who carries a balance to repay credit card debt -or default on it through bankruptcy -is somewhat longer than 3.5 years. Results do not differ significantly with other reasonable risk free rates (i.e., the 10 year treasury). The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [hereinafter "BLS"] is the principal fact-finding agency for the Federal Government in the broad field of labor economics and statistics. The BLS is an independent national statistical agency that collects, processes, analyzes, and disseminates essential statistical data to the American public, the U.S. Congress, other Federal agencies, State and local governments, business, and labor. The BLS also serves as a statistical resource to the Department of Labor. BLS data on inflation and unemployment may be downloaded at http://www.bls.gov/data/. 27 The Economist Intelligence Unit is a subscription based provider of data, analysis and forecasts on countries, industries, and management strategies. Its subscribers include large international companies, (for accessing some government and private date in easier to use form). All data used in this study is on file with the author and with the American Bankruptcy Law Journal, and is available to researchers upon request. The present study uses CardData for credit card interest rates because it is more comprehensive than the other leading data source, the Federal Reserve G.19. Whereas CardData is gathered through a regular direct survey of 150 issuers, representing 97% of the market, G.19 data is based on a survey of the 50 largest card issuers and a limited sampling of others. has another advantage over Federal Reserve G.19 data: CardData more accurately reflects the long term trend in interest rates. CardData excludes "teaser rates" (defined as temporary rates lasting 1 year or less). Teaser rates can introduce substantial variability in nominal interest rates without significantly reducing borrowers' actual cost of borrowing. The average household carrying a balance on its credit card has been carrying it for over 3.5 years, and families with larger balances tend to carry their debt for longer than those with smaller balances. Center for Responsible Lending, The Plastic Safety Net: The Reality behind Debt in America, 8 (2005) , http://www.demos.org/pubs/PNSjlow.pdf. Although families carry balances for significantly longer than the 3 to 12 month term of a teaser rate, they generally fail to switch to a lower interest card when the teaser rate expires. Haiyan, Shui & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Market, 9 (May 3, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=586622. This enables credit card companies to acquire customers who are likely to carry balances by offering a low introductory rate, and then profit by charging them a much higher rate for several years.
3 The bars represent quarterly personal bankruptcy filings, in thousands. The line represents credit card company chargeoffs as a percent of average loans and leases. The chart appeared in the FDIC's Quarterly Banking Profile, but has been modified for this paper to indicate the timing of bankruptcy reform. The timing of bankruptcy reform is represented by the large grey vertical rectangle, pointed out by the large down arrow. BAPCPA was enacted at the left most portion of the rectangle, and its key provisions went into effect at the right most portion of the rectangle. This convention for representing the timing of BAPCPA is used for all charts in this paper. The data for this chart appears in the appendix, in pre-BAPCPA statute. Nonetheless, at least some of the reduction in bankruptcy filing rates and credit card company losses appears to be permanent. Although bankruptcy filings and loss rates increased in 2007 compared to 2006, 2007 rates remained significantly below recent pre-BAPCPA rates (2002) (2003) (2004) . In 2006, losses as a percent of loans were 25% lower than in 2005.31 In 2007, losses as a percent of loans were 15% lower than in 2005.32 These results are reflected in Figure 2 below, which shows annual credit card loss rates before, during, and after BAPCPA.
The value of this decrease in credit card loss rates is difficult to estimate, but may be as high as $8.6 billion in 2006 and $5.9 billion in 2007.
3 3 The true value is likely slightly lower because this estimate is based on revolving credit, which is primarily but not exclusively credit card debt, 3 4 and because some of the decrease in charge-offs may be due to factors other than BAPCPA, such as improved information technology or collections techniques.
B. CREDIT CARD LATE FEES AND OVER-LIMIT FEES INCREASED WHILE GRACE PERIODS DECREASED
Credit card fees have been climbing and have become less transparent over the years 35 and there is no evidence that BAPCPA reversed this trend.
3 Loan losses fell from 4.64% to 3.48%. 32 Loan losses fell from 4.64% to 3.95%. 33 The value can be estimated as follows: First calculate the total decrease in charge-offs by multiplying the average revolving credit balance for the year (which roughly approximates credit card debt, but also includes other forms of debt) by the decrease in loss rates between pre-and postbankruptcy reform years. Then calculate the gain from the decrease in charge-offs by subtracting the price at which credit card companies can sell recently charged-off debt to collection agencies -typically 8 cents on the dollar. A substantial proportion of credit card users pay late fees and over-limit fees. In 2005, issuers reporting to the Government Accountability Office charged late fees to 35% of their active U.S. accounts and over-limit fees to 13% of their active U.S. accounts. 38 The likelihood of incurring a late fee has increased over time as credit card companies reduced grace periods. This trend continued after BAPCPA, as shown in Figure 4 below. Indeed, from 2005 to 2007, grace periods fell 1.5%.39
C. CREDIT CARD INTEREST RATES AND THE SPREAD ABOVE THE RISK FREE RATE BOTH INCREASED
The interest rates charged by credit card companies have increased after BAPCPA. Figure 5 below shows that the annual percentage rate (APR) on standard, gold, and platinum cards have all increased.
Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 103 (2000) . According to the Government Accountability Office, many consumers do not fully appreciate these fees because of faulty disclosure by credit card companies.
Furthermore, the portion of credit card company revenues attributable to penalty fees has been climbing. gao.gov/new.items/d06929.pdf (last visited February 6, 2009) . At the same time, credit card companies reduced or eliminated more transparent annual fees because of "hostility of consumers ... evidenced by the fact that when annual fees were first imposed, consumers canceled over nine million bank cards in 1980, amounting to some 8% of the outstanding total." Todd Zywicki. The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 118 (2000) . Average late fees among credit card companies with portfolios larger than $100 million climbed from under $13 in December 1994 to over $35 in December 2007 (CardWeb CardData). During the same period, over-limit fees climbed from less than $11 to more than $26 while annual fees on standard credit cards fell from $17 to $13 (CardWeb CardData).
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO CONSUMERS
36CardWeb CardData. Fees are for portfolios greater than $100 million. Fees for portfolios less than $100 million showed a similar pattern. The Government Accountability Office estimates that 10% of credit card company revenues come from penalty fees. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 35, at 67.
37
As early as 2000, Professor Zywicki reported "the virtual elimination of annual fees" and that remaining annual fees were generally tied to particular services, such as frequent flyer miles, not plain vanilla cards offering only payment and credit services. Todd Zywicki. The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 118 (2000) . "8U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 35, at 5. Figure 7 below shows the dramatic increase in the spread between credit card interest rates and risk free rates after BAPCPA went into effect.
Even if the spread had remained the same, customers would have suffered harm, because credit would be no less expensive, and customers would have lost the protection afforded them under the pre-BAPCPA statute. The widening of the spread highlights the fact that credit card companies benefited at consumers' expense.
D. RESULTS SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME WITH ADDITIONAL

CONTROLS
Applying additional controls does not substantially change the results described above. The following additional controls are included in the data presented in Table 2 of the Appendix: Credit card fees are adjusted for inflation by deflating them to 2000 dollars; the number of bankruptcies is adjusted for population growth by calculating the bankruptcy rate, or annualized personal bankruptcy filings per U.S. household; the period between the adoption of BAPCPA and when it went into effect is excluded; and the quarter immediately after the effective date of BAPCPA is excluded (on the assumption that bankruptcy rates were abnormally low following the spike just before BAPCPA went into effect).
The "Before" column on Table 2 is the average from the third quarter of 2003 through the first quarter of 2005. The "After" column is the average from the second quarter of 2006 through the fourth quarter of 2007. Both "Before" and "After" include 7 quarters of data. This data still show a large decrease in bankruptcies and charge-offs. The data still show an increase in credit card interest rates and interest rate spreads, as well as a moderate increase in over-limit and late fees and a decrease in annual fees.
The economic outlook after BAPCPA was mixed. Although unemployment fell -suggesting a strengthening economy -the growth of real gross 42 Bloomberg, supra note 22.
3
The spread increased from 13.8% to 15.7%. 
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with an increase in bankruptcies and charge-offs. 44 The lack of a clear macroeconomic explanation for the sharp and sudden decrease in charge-offs and bankruptcies after BAPCPA went into effect suggests that the statute contributed to these phenomena.
E. CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ACHIEVED RECORD PROFITS
Even though credit card companies saved billions because of reduced loan loss rates after BAPCPA, 4 5 the cost to credit card customers increased 5% to 17%.46 This combination of lower costs and higher prices drove record profits, as shown below in Figure 8 .
IV. DISCUSSION: A MARKET WITH MINIMAL PRICE COMPETITION
What could explain the lack of benefit to consumers, in spite of the clear benefit to credit card companies? Credit card companies can retain the benefit of fewer bankruptcies rather than share it with their customers if credit card companies can avoid competing with one another on price.
Several factors enable credit card companies to avoid price competition. One is industry consolidation. Figure 9 below shows the trend toward consolidation, which had been going on for some time and has continued after the enactment of BAPCPA.
In 2005, the top 10 issuers controlled 87% of the market. 10 years earlier, the top 10 controlled only 56%.
47 With fewer companies controlling a larger share of the market, it has become easier to avoid "price wars" (the real-world equivalent of the competitive markets described by economics textbooks) that benefit consumers but harm all of the producers in an industry.
48
Credit card companies may also be able to avoid price competition because switching costs are high for the most profitable customers. 49 The most "From 1996 through the first quarter of 2005, unemployment and charge-offs were positively correlated at about 0.58. Unemployment and bankruptcy rates were correlated at 0.47. FORs and charge-offs were positively correlated at 0.5. FORs and bankruptcy were positively correlated at 0.59. GDP growth and charge-offs were negatively correlated at -0.13. GDP growth and bankruptcy were slightly negatively correlated at -0.07. 4 See supra Section 3A.
4'Nominal prices increased, except for annual fees, which were in decline long before bankruptcy reform. See supra Section 3A. Controlling for inflation and other factors, as described in supra Section 3D, and excluding annual fees, real prices increased between 1% and 13%. 47 Nilson Report, supra note 23.
4sIt also has become easier for credit card companies to organize and coordinate mutually beneficial activity, such as lobbying Congress to change the bankruptcy laws. 
6.uoo c
Source: CardWeb CardData, Bloomberg profitable customers are those that are financially distressed, because they are the most likely to incur interest charges and fees. However, these financially distressed customers can suddenly cease to be profitable when they become unable to repay their debts or when they discharge their debts through bankruptcy. A customer's existing credit card company has a great deal of propri- etary information -what the customer buys, when the customer began falling behind on his or her debts, how far behind he or she is, the monthly payment he or she makes, etc.-that improves the lender's ability to predict when the customer will cease to be profitable. Would-be competitors lack this information. It is therefore very risky and costly for a competitor to try to poach financially distressed customers from their existing card company. This results in an environment in which price competition is limited, and in which cost savings are more likely to be retained by the credit card companies than passed on to customers. The credit card industry might also be able to avoid price competition because of complex, multi-tiered pricing that can make it difficult for customers to comparison shop. 50 Pricing can include multiple variables -annual fees, late fees, over-limit fees, currency conversion fees, cash-advance fees, standard interest rates, cash-advance interest rates, introductory interest rates, penalty interest rates, etc. These fees and interest rates -complex in their own right -are presented in a form that is difficult to understand.
1
Customers faced with such complex pricing systematically miscalculate and underestimate the cost of credit card debt.
52
The empirical record on consumers' ability to comparison shop points toward a market that is far from price-competitive. Studies have shown that most consumers will irrationally choose a card with a low introductory interest rate over a less expensive card with a higher introductory rate. After the introductory rate expires, these consumers generally fail to switch to a lower interest card. 53 According to the General Accountability Office, many consumers do not fully appreciate -and therefore cannot comparison shop -late fees and penalty interest rates because of faulty disclosures by credit card companies. 54 Studies suggest that although customers who were assessed late fees in the recent past can learn to avoid fees in the short-term future, the learning is at best temporary. 55 Finally, although over half of consumers can rationally choose between a lower interest rate card with an annual fee and a 5°L evitin, supra note 34, at 18. higher interest rate with no annual fee, a substantial minority (40%) will initially make the wrong choice.5 6 Whatever the underlying reason, rising prices in the face of falling risks and costs demonstrate that the credit card industry is not price-competitive.
In 2000, Professor Todd Zywicki published an article defending credit card companies against charges that the industry was not competitive and that regulations could squeeze their profit margins without harming consumers. Professor Zywicki wrote: "[I]f the credit card market is largely competitive, then bankruptcy losses will [be passed on] to consumers, rather than being primarily a wealth transfer from credit card issuers to consumers in the form of reductions in these profits."5 7 Zywicki asserted that the industry was competitive, even though credit card interest rates did not respond to rising bankruptcy losses, because credit card companies passed those costs on to consumers in other ways: through "increased fees and penalties for late payments and [over-limit fees] . . . . [T] he increase in these fees by card issuers is a direct response to the increased default rate in recent years;" 5 8 and through "the steady erosion in the length of the non-interest grace period."
59
After BAPCPA, interest rates and fees continued to rise and grace periods continued to fall, even though credit card companies reaped tremendous gains from declining bankruptcy losses. This demonstrates -under the very criteria set forth by Professor Zywicki -that the credit card market is not price-competitive. This lack of price competition explains why the benefits of bankruptcy reform accrued exclusively to credit card lenders and were not shared with the average American family, and why -by Professor Zywicki's own criteria -BAPCPA was a failure.
V. CONCLUSION: LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND COMPETITIVE MARKETS
The data is unambiguous: BAPCPA benefited credit card companies and hurt their customers. While bankruptcy protection became increasingly unavailable, credit card companies increased prices by 5% to 17%. This contributed to a 25% increase in credit card industry annual profits from If there were a bankruptcy "tax," then presumably there would have been a bankruptcy "tax rebate" upon the passage of BAPCPA. 63 At least with respect to credit cards, there has not been one. In fact, prices have increased.
In fairness to Professor Zywicki, predicting the future is always perilous, and his predictions would have been reasonable if the credit card market were transparent and price-competitive. The data demonstrate that the credit card market simply is not. Professor Zywicki should have given real consideration to the possibility that the industry might not be price-competitive, instead of dismissing that possibility as "facially implausible and empirically doubtful." 6 4 Although Zywicki pointed to some indicators of a dynamic market -shifting market share, entrants and exists, a large number of small The bill. S.256, was voted on along party lines. Every Republican in the Senate voted for the bill, as did all but three Republicans in the House of Representatives (the three other Republicans abstained). A majority of Democrats in both the House and Senate voted against the bill. Even so, a significant minority of Democrats (roughly one third of Democratic House members and 40% of Democratic Senators) voted in favor of the bill. A roll call for the Senate is available at 151 CONG. REc. S2474. A roll call for the House is available at 151 CONG. REc. H2076 -H2077. players -he ignored key signs that the industry was not price-competitivecomplex, misleading pricing structures and prices that did not respond to changes in costs. These features of the credit card market had been pointed out by researchers such as Lawrence Ausubel as early as 1997.65 Nevertheless, Professor Zywicki went so far as to conclude that "the credit card industry appears to be as close a representation to a perfectly competitive market as one could imagine."
66
This paper demonstrates why scholars who wish to predict the impact of regulatory change must not assume that markets are price-competitive and instead must analyze each industry individually. Uncompetitive markets are more profitable for producing firms than competitive markets. The creation of such highly profitable, uncompetitive environments (without running afoul of regulators) is therefore often the goal of corporate strategy and of sales, marketing, and legal departments. Failure to consider the implications of uncompetitive markets is a severe analytical flaw. It calls into question both the predictive value of theoretical economic analysis and the purported objectivity with which it is conducted. On the other hand, robust empirical analysis, independent of any ideological assumptions, can lead to better scholarship and better policy. BANKR. LJ. 249, 263 (1997) . 66 Todd Zywicki. 
